Thanks, Massimo! This is great. Despite being a scientist and having read some Cicero back in school, I never learned what the Skeptics were actually all about (or any other ancient schools of philosophy, for that matter). Carneades is shaping up to become a new hero of mine. :-)
I find this exceptionally relevant as a person who often teaches university rhetoric/argument. Students often have to be disabused of the need to prove their point to the absolute certainty, and of the notion that the only thesis worth arguing is a thesis that contains an air of total certainty and has a conclusion that gives the impression of absolute victory. They have to be often reminded that they can only argue what their evidence shows, and that what the evidence shows is a suggestion, or a probability.
Anyway, a lot to take away from this post. I would like to have the time to read some Cicero and Carneades someday.
I wonder why the Stoics even held so strongly to the doctrine of Katalepsis; considering Epictetus (cf. Fragments 1) and Marcus seem to have both adopted (or at least allowed for) rather skeptical views on Physics, I always thought the whole skepticism/dogmatism debate to be rather inconsequential to “on the ground” Stoic practice, as it were.
Even if one is a committed ‘Zenonian’ on this issue, the fact that pretty much none of us are Sages under early Stoicism seems to mean that for all intents and purposes, any Stoic practitioner should adopt a provisional Skeptical stance anyhow. Perhaps this would even go for the Sage (even if he does have Kataleptic impressions) considering the idea that one technically could never know whether one has become a Sage.
Re: Epictetus’ attacks on Skepticism, which I believe is what you alluded to in your article - I always got the sense that what he was really arguing against were people who used Skeptical arguments for ‘unproductive’ purposes. For example there’s no point in categorically “doubting the evidence of the senses” as E puts it in Diss 1.5 because it’s just impossible to totally ignore them when one makes decisions (hence the bath/mill example)
I’m not sure if he was simply ignorant of the nuances of the Academics’ and Pyrrho’s views or if he was arguing against some extreme positions taken by their followers during his day (similar to how he clearly disapproves of contemporary Cynics while still appreciating the original Cynic philosophy). He clearly had a great respect for Plato/Socrates who did emphatically deny the possibility of true knowledge in this life, so I think it’s possible E had more nuanced views on epistemology himself.
You continued to teach me that I don't know near as much as I thought--or as I should. I should be embarrassed, but you manage to keep from making me feel that way. Thanks, Massimo.
Thanks, Massimo! This is great. Despite being a scientist and having read some Cicero back in school, I never learned what the Skeptics were actually all about (or any other ancient schools of philosophy, for that matter). Carneades is shaping up to become a new hero of mine. :-)
I find this exceptionally relevant as a person who often teaches university rhetoric/argument. Students often have to be disabused of the need to prove their point to the absolute certainty, and of the notion that the only thesis worth arguing is a thesis that contains an air of total certainty and has a conclusion that gives the impression of absolute victory. They have to be often reminded that they can only argue what their evidence shows, and that what the evidence shows is a suggestion, or a probability.
Anyway, a lot to take away from this post. I would like to have the time to read some Cicero and Carneades someday.
I wonder why the Stoics even held so strongly to the doctrine of Katalepsis; considering Epictetus (cf. Fragments 1) and Marcus seem to have both adopted (or at least allowed for) rather skeptical views on Physics, I always thought the whole skepticism/dogmatism debate to be rather inconsequential to “on the ground” Stoic practice, as it were.
Even if one is a committed ‘Zenonian’ on this issue, the fact that pretty much none of us are Sages under early Stoicism seems to mean that for all intents and purposes, any Stoic practitioner should adopt a provisional Skeptical stance anyhow. Perhaps this would even go for the Sage (even if he does have Kataleptic impressions) considering the idea that one technically could never know whether one has become a Sage.
Re: Epictetus’ attacks on Skepticism, which I believe is what you alluded to in your article - I always got the sense that what he was really arguing against were people who used Skeptical arguments for ‘unproductive’ purposes. For example there’s no point in categorically “doubting the evidence of the senses” as E puts it in Diss 1.5 because it’s just impossible to totally ignore them when one makes decisions (hence the bath/mill example)
I’m not sure if he was simply ignorant of the nuances of the Academics’ and Pyrrho’s views or if he was arguing against some extreme positions taken by their followers during his day (similar to how he clearly disapproves of contemporary Cynics while still appreciating the original Cynic philosophy). He clearly had a great respect for Plato/Socrates who did emphatically deny the possibility of true knowledge in this life, so I think it’s possible E had more nuanced views on epistemology himself.
You continued to teach me that I don't know near as much as I thought--or as I should. I should be embarrassed, but you manage to keep from making me feel that way. Thanks, Massimo.
Massimo, I enjoyed this article and found the distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological claims about truth well said.
Excellent piece! I look forward to your next essay on Cicero, and your eventual book on him.