I have been thinking that there needs to be a component of personal relativism or moral skepticism in any moral theory that we ought to consider. That being, "maybe we're wrong". Both in the present and in the future, by which I mean on reflection.
I am a layman so maybe this is old ground but I am surprised I haven't come across it. Any thoughts or sign posts are appreciated!
Hi Massimo, very much enjoyed the article and helpful references. I have a question about the structure of the argument. If one doesn't accept the axiom in the IF statement (e.g. caring about human welfare, say a Stalin) then there are not any facts (e.g. human welfare) to reason about. Is this correct? If so, then are we not back to relativism? Or alternatively, is it the case that only agreement on starting axioms result in agreement of moral facts?
I think though it’s worth keeping in mind that in contexts like war, manslaughter, self-defense, etc., the rightness or wrongness is certainly debatable and not subject to purely objective standards or rules, and it also seems to me that concepts like gain, pleasure and randomness are also inherently subjective.
I was thinking about this discussion last night, and a related scenario which came to mind which I think illustrates the issue well is, of course, the trolley problem (I know, I know…). It’s a situation which does involve killing. And where you could have Epicurus, Aristotle, Bentham and Kant all evaluating the rightness and wrongness of the various permutations and each reaching a different conclusion, all the while applying perfect reason and logic. And even within schools of thought, you could see Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca all reaching different conclusions too, depending on the facts and circumstances.
Reason is like English, or a level. It’s a tool with its own internal rules and processes, and it can be evaluated and judged on that basis. Perhaps we could call that internal objectivity. I would be objectively mistaken if I spelled “Stoic” as “Sgdfgfdghd.” But when we apply those tools in any given situation, we bring to bear values, priorities, facts, perspectives, circumstances, etc that are ultimately subjective, or if objective (like a fact) are interpreted through a subjective lens. Our reason helps us analyze the inputs, and generate a range of outputs which it then helps us rank and ultimately take us to a choice or decision. And I think you are right that in so so many cases, there is so much enormous and persuasive consensus that it can feel “objective.” But I would still contend that it is not.
I am tempted in cases like this to dismiss the conversation entirely and say, we agree on substance, and practically speaking, there is no real daylight between our positions. And that this is just an academic and irrelevant discussion. But I don’t think it is. I think it’s really important that we stare the reality in the face and wrestle with it. And that’s that we are floating in a disenchanted universe with no a priori or transcendent - or objective - demands or rules when it comes to ethics - or morals - and it’s the human project to figure that out.
It’s why I enjoy your writing so much. You are not afraid to follow your training as both a scientist and a philosopher to its ultimate and logical conclusions, even if those positions may be shocking and rattling to many - and in their own way, anti-social. It’s how we get out of the cave. And I really appreciate and value the work you do on that front.
Thank you for another thoughtful and thought provoking article. It seems, as usual, the extremes on both sides are wrong and the truth is found somewhere between them. I think of myself as a moral pluralist; that a minimum amount of a kind of “moral realism” can be loosely defined on practical grounds as a framework for individual freedom. I just don’t believe that it is metaphysical and true for all people at all times.
I’m not a moral relativist because I think morality is social, and therefore things that are antisocial are not moral. (Again, what’s antisocial isn’t defined metaphysically, but practically within a society.) Morality differs from virtue in part because if I am stranded alone on an island, I can still be virtuous, but there are no one to interact with. Morality doesn’t seem to exist with out social interaction. Am I wrong or misunderstanding something?
Thanks for an insightful discussion of moral values and moral objectivity.
I see another possibility for understanding what is objectively moral.
If we use the right definitions of moral and immoral, a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is possible.
Specifically,
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are ‘moral’.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are ‘immoral’.
Here, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’
• Refer to behaviors consistent with or contradictory to the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist – they solve cooperation problems.
• And do NOT refer to any imperative obligations or “What everyone ought do regardless of their needs and preferences” (Mackie identified the existence of such things as impossibly strange and Michael Ruse identifies them as “illusions foisted on us by our genes”).
Whether or not there is a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity depends on how we define the word moral. If “moral” is defined as imperative obligations, then it is impossible for the reasons Mackie described. But if “moral” is defined (as science suggests) as consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist, then deriving a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is straightforward using the normal methods of science.
We are free to make philosophical definitions of moral and immoral however we think will be most useful or coherent. Will the functional definition be more culturally useful and philosophically coherent? I expect so. It should be easy to be more useful and coherent than the imperative ought definition which describes something that exists only as an illusion.
The idea that we could philosophically define moral behaviors as those consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist (their function) seems to me an idea worth discussion.
The moral quasi-realism approach has a lot to commend it. But there is an interesting question that comes out of considering the analogy between ethics and health that applies to virtue ethics. I am thinking here of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. Let's use the term eudaimonia to refer to human welfare and flourishing as the end goal of ethics. This compares to the notion of good health as an end goal. The problem arises: how do you define eudaimonia? Or for that matter, how do you define health? The ethical definition can be given in terms of the virtues and our instrumentality - how we work towards eudaimonia. The analogy to health is pretty clear: you are healthy if you have a sound mind in a sound body, and this can be measured in terms of a number of physiological and psychological "virtues".
It may be that there is not, and will never be, a good definition of either health or eudaimonia. They are moving targets. Aristotle passed away at the ripe old age of 62, which says that he was probably very healthy for a dude in his era. But that just does not cut it anymore. The same goes for how much eudaimonia is optimal. Is there a maximum value, so to speak? This kind of kicks the moral relativism question up a level. I really have a lot of problems with moral relativism, but we have to be careful in defining quasi-realism without begging the question.
To get a sense of what I am referring to, compare mathematics. About a century ago, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem put Hilbert's program of fully specifying mathematics out of reach. But that does not make our mathematical caluculations non-real and subjective. Instead, it implies that our ultimate goals, be they health or eudaimonia, are provisional, and relative to the current state of affairs we live in. In essence, this is the axiom set we live in, what is worthy (axios).
I think that it is safe to say that both medicine and morality are open-ended disciplines. I have my doubts that physics will ever find a Theory of Everything. Similarly, I doubt that you can come up with an ultimate definition of a healthy life or a complete list of the Vistues.
A well written and stimulating article as always. Many thanks. My only comment is that we’d do well to simply jettison the siren song of objectivity when it comes to ethics. It doesn’t exist (quasi or otherwise). When we play that game, we lose the argument before it even starts. Instead, it’s best to stick to a relativistic framework - because it’s true - but don’t concede that relativism requires that we stop with “no objectivity means anything goes” a la Dostoevsky. There is nothing which “objectively” determines or mechanically drives us to a singular transcendent outcome (this isn’t math or science). That said, only the most stubborn and dogmatic counterparty would say there is no basis on which to make reasoned and appropriate judgments (“anything goes” relativism). That basis is reason. And it’s also entirely fair for us to say - using reason - that those judgments can be applicable in virtually every circumstance to virtually all people WITHOUT being “objective.” It’s the beauty of Virtue Ethics - to me, once you’ve jettisoned the notion of the logos and all the metaphysics with its attendant finery, it’s the singular reason to subscribe to that ethical philosophy. It gives us the tools to muscularly navigate what is indeed a relativistic universe using reason and rationality, and simple common sense.
There are constraints, corrective feedback loops, evolved behaviors, and variations over time/place for living systems. We, as social mammals, are wired to seek group survival and well-being. Some philosophers place responsibility on the clan/tribe/society rather than on the individual. Deviants are corrected for the common good. Rather than look to absolutes or ideologies, socio-biology seems to me a better source to suss out guidelines for behavior. (am a old time amateur, so forgive any terminology errors)
Great article has had me thinking all morning & debating with my wife. Ethics is good for mental health & the spectrum varies from simple day to day interactions with your fellow being to the extreme of exploiting people. Unfortunately society at large has lost its moral compass. Anyway thank you for your article.
This is an article I will return to again and again to keep my thoughts clear and arguments ready. It's that all important "if / ought"; (if you want to be healthy, then you ought to eat healthy food) that should guide our choices and actions and not some dictate (cultural , political or religious). Thanks for a great article.
I think we've been here before. We say that X is unethical because it leads to up consequence Y. If our opponent is for example a free market ideologue, they will maintain that free-market policies the best way to achieve the human flourishing that we both desire, and we have a disagreement about facts. On the other hand, if our opponent maintains that the only thing that really matters is getting people to accept Christ as their personal saviour (and I come across this argument all the time as I follow the creationist literature), I see no resolution by argument.
What would you say of Tom Sawyer, who really believes that helping Jim escape is a damnable sin, but feels moved to do it anyway?
I have been thinking that there needs to be a component of personal relativism or moral skepticism in any moral theory that we ought to consider. That being, "maybe we're wrong". Both in the present and in the future, by which I mean on reflection.
I am a layman so maybe this is old ground but I am surprised I haven't come across it. Any thoughts or sign posts are appreciated!
Hi Massimo, very much enjoyed the article and helpful references. I have a question about the structure of the argument. If one doesn't accept the axiom in the IF statement (e.g. caring about human welfare, say a Stalin) then there are not any facts (e.g. human welfare) to reason about. Is this correct? If so, then are we not back to relativism? Or alternatively, is it the case that only agreement on starting axioms result in agreement of moral facts?
You keep on teaching me. Thanks.
I think though it’s worth keeping in mind that in contexts like war, manslaughter, self-defense, etc., the rightness or wrongness is certainly debatable and not subject to purely objective standards or rules, and it also seems to me that concepts like gain, pleasure and randomness are also inherently subjective.
I was thinking about this discussion last night, and a related scenario which came to mind which I think illustrates the issue well is, of course, the trolley problem (I know, I know…). It’s a situation which does involve killing. And where you could have Epicurus, Aristotle, Bentham and Kant all evaluating the rightness and wrongness of the various permutations and each reaching a different conclusion, all the while applying perfect reason and logic. And even within schools of thought, you could see Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca all reaching different conclusions too, depending on the facts and circumstances.
Reason is like English, or a level. It’s a tool with its own internal rules and processes, and it can be evaluated and judged on that basis. Perhaps we could call that internal objectivity. I would be objectively mistaken if I spelled “Stoic” as “Sgdfgfdghd.” But when we apply those tools in any given situation, we bring to bear values, priorities, facts, perspectives, circumstances, etc that are ultimately subjective, or if objective (like a fact) are interpreted through a subjective lens. Our reason helps us analyze the inputs, and generate a range of outputs which it then helps us rank and ultimately take us to a choice or decision. And I think you are right that in so so many cases, there is so much enormous and persuasive consensus that it can feel “objective.” But I would still contend that it is not.
I am tempted in cases like this to dismiss the conversation entirely and say, we agree on substance, and practically speaking, there is no real daylight between our positions. And that this is just an academic and irrelevant discussion. But I don’t think it is. I think it’s really important that we stare the reality in the face and wrestle with it. And that’s that we are floating in a disenchanted universe with no a priori or transcendent - or objective - demands or rules when it comes to ethics - or morals - and it’s the human project to figure that out.
It’s why I enjoy your writing so much. You are not afraid to follow your training as both a scientist and a philosopher to its ultimate and logical conclusions, even if those positions may be shocking and rattling to many - and in their own way, anti-social. It’s how we get out of the cave. And I really appreciate and value the work you do on that front.
Thank you for another thoughtful and thought provoking article. It seems, as usual, the extremes on both sides are wrong and the truth is found somewhere between them. I think of myself as a moral pluralist; that a minimum amount of a kind of “moral realism” can be loosely defined on practical grounds as a framework for individual freedom. I just don’t believe that it is metaphysical and true for all people at all times.
I’m not a moral relativist because I think morality is social, and therefore things that are antisocial are not moral. (Again, what’s antisocial isn’t defined metaphysically, but practically within a society.) Morality differs from virtue in part because if I am stranded alone on an island, I can still be virtuous, but there are no one to interact with. Morality doesn’t seem to exist with out social interaction. Am I wrong or misunderstanding something?
Massimo,
Thanks for an insightful discussion of moral values and moral objectivity.
I see another possibility for understanding what is objectively moral.
If we use the right definitions of moral and immoral, a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is possible.
Specifically,
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are ‘moral’.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are ‘immoral’.
Here, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’
• Refer to behaviors consistent with or contradictory to the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist – they solve cooperation problems.
• And do NOT refer to any imperative obligations or “What everyone ought do regardless of their needs and preferences” (Mackie identified the existence of such things as impossibly strange and Michael Ruse identifies them as “illusions foisted on us by our genes”).
Whether or not there is a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity depends on how we define the word moral. If “moral” is defined as imperative obligations, then it is impossible for the reasons Mackie described. But if “moral” is defined (as science suggests) as consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist, then deriving a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is straightforward using the normal methods of science.
We are free to make philosophical definitions of moral and immoral however we think will be most useful or coherent. Will the functional definition be more culturally useful and philosophically coherent? I expect so. It should be easy to be more useful and coherent than the imperative ought definition which describes something that exists only as an illusion.
The idea that we could philosophically define moral behaviors as those consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist (their function) seems to me an idea worth discussion.
The moral quasi-realism approach has a lot to commend it. But there is an interesting question that comes out of considering the analogy between ethics and health that applies to virtue ethics. I am thinking here of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. Let's use the term eudaimonia to refer to human welfare and flourishing as the end goal of ethics. This compares to the notion of good health as an end goal. The problem arises: how do you define eudaimonia? Or for that matter, how do you define health? The ethical definition can be given in terms of the virtues and our instrumentality - how we work towards eudaimonia. The analogy to health is pretty clear: you are healthy if you have a sound mind in a sound body, and this can be measured in terms of a number of physiological and psychological "virtues".
It may be that there is not, and will never be, a good definition of either health or eudaimonia. They are moving targets. Aristotle passed away at the ripe old age of 62, which says that he was probably very healthy for a dude in his era. But that just does not cut it anymore. The same goes for how much eudaimonia is optimal. Is there a maximum value, so to speak? This kind of kicks the moral relativism question up a level. I really have a lot of problems with moral relativism, but we have to be careful in defining quasi-realism without begging the question.
To get a sense of what I am referring to, compare mathematics. About a century ago, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem put Hilbert's program of fully specifying mathematics out of reach. But that does not make our mathematical caluculations non-real and subjective. Instead, it implies that our ultimate goals, be they health or eudaimonia, are provisional, and relative to the current state of affairs we live in. In essence, this is the axiom set we live in, what is worthy (axios).
I think that it is safe to say that both medicine and morality are open-ended disciplines. I have my doubts that physics will ever find a Theory of Everything. Similarly, I doubt that you can come up with an ultimate definition of a healthy life or a complete list of the Vistues.
A well written and stimulating article as always. Many thanks. My only comment is that we’d do well to simply jettison the siren song of objectivity when it comes to ethics. It doesn’t exist (quasi or otherwise). When we play that game, we lose the argument before it even starts. Instead, it’s best to stick to a relativistic framework - because it’s true - but don’t concede that relativism requires that we stop with “no objectivity means anything goes” a la Dostoevsky. There is nothing which “objectively” determines or mechanically drives us to a singular transcendent outcome (this isn’t math or science). That said, only the most stubborn and dogmatic counterparty would say there is no basis on which to make reasoned and appropriate judgments (“anything goes” relativism). That basis is reason. And it’s also entirely fair for us to say - using reason - that those judgments can be applicable in virtually every circumstance to virtually all people WITHOUT being “objective.” It’s the beauty of Virtue Ethics - to me, once you’ve jettisoned the notion of the logos and all the metaphysics with its attendant finery, it’s the singular reason to subscribe to that ethical philosophy. It gives us the tools to muscularly navigate what is indeed a relativistic universe using reason and rationality, and simple common sense.
There are constraints, corrective feedback loops, evolved behaviors, and variations over time/place for living systems. We, as social mammals, are wired to seek group survival and well-being. Some philosophers place responsibility on the clan/tribe/society rather than on the individual. Deviants are corrected for the common good. Rather than look to absolutes or ideologies, socio-biology seems to me a better source to suss out guidelines for behavior. (am a old time amateur, so forgive any terminology errors)
Great article has had me thinking all morning & debating with my wife. Ethics is good for mental health & the spectrum varies from simple day to day interactions with your fellow being to the extreme of exploiting people. Unfortunately society at large has lost its moral compass. Anyway thank you for your article.
This is an article I will return to again and again to keep my thoughts clear and arguments ready. It's that all important "if / ought"; (if you want to be healthy, then you ought to eat healthy food) that should guide our choices and actions and not some dictate (cultural , political or religious). Thanks for a great article.
I think we've been here before. We say that X is unethical because it leads to up consequence Y. If our opponent is for example a free market ideologue, they will maintain that free-market policies the best way to achieve the human flourishing that we both desire, and we have a disagreement about facts. On the other hand, if our opponent maintains that the only thing that really matters is getting people to accept Christ as their personal saviour (and I come across this argument all the time as I follow the creationist literature), I see no resolution by argument.
What would you say of Tom Sawyer, who really believes that helping Jim escape is a damnable sin, but feels moved to do it anyway?