From ancient to new Stoicism: V—Piotr Stankiewicz’s Reformed Stoicism
A conceptual map of where Stoicism came from and where it may be going
This series of essays is meant to provide, as the subtitle says, a conceptual map of where Stoic philosophy came from and where it may be going. So far, we have looked in depth at the three fields of inquiry defining ancient Stoicism: science-metaphysics [1], logic, and ethics. We have then examined what I think remains so far the most comprehensive, if somewhat challenging to follow, attempt at modernizing Stoicism: the one articulated by Larry Becker.
In this entry we’ll consider a second such attempt: Piotr Stankiewicz’s Reformed Stoicism, as presented in his major book devoted to the topic. Stankiewicz has clearly been inspired by Becker, and yet the two attempts have relatively little in common, as we shall see. In fact, let me begin immediately with the greatest contrast between the two approaches: Becker strives to recover modern versions of Stoic science-metaphysics, logic, and ethics, because he wants—like the ancient Stoics—to ground ethics in the other two. Not so Stankiewicz, who explicitly rejects both the Stoic view of the world and their advice on how to think about things. Indeed, he rejects any kind of science-metaphysics and logic:
“This book contains no vague theory and no abstractions. Reformed Stoicism is about practice and real action. … We don’t shackle ourselves to any metaphysical point of view.” (pp. ix, x)
There is a problem with this approach: it’s simply not possible. It has been tried before, by the way. Among others, by Ariston the Bold of Chios, who flourished around 260 BCE. Diogenes Laertius tells us:
“He dispensed with the topics of physics and logic, saying that the one is beyond our grasp, that the other does not concern us, and that the only one that does concern us is ethics.” (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, VII.161)
Ariston’s attempt floundered because one cannot develop a free-floating ethics, as Becker himself makes very clear in his A New Stoicism. Ethics is about solving the problem of how to thrive, as an individual, within a social group. As such, it requires knowledge of facts about how the world works, and especially about human nature (by use of science-metaphysics). Moreover, such knowledge has to be digested in a way that makes sense in light of human goals, needs, and wants (by use of logic). So, try as hard as one might, one simply cannot build an ethical system without the other two components. And yet, Stankiewicz claims that he does. How? He explains:
“We rely on the usefulness rather than on the truth value of narratives.” (p. x)
And elaborates:
“The world we live in is not a world of facts, things and events, but a world of our narratives about facts, things and events. … Our life consists not in facts, but in our narratives. … Our happiness and misery depend on our narratives.” (p. 3)
Superficially, this sounds a lot like Epictetus’s famous distinction between what is and is not up to us, and his contention that “People are troubled not by things but by their judgments about things” (Enchiridion 5a). This, in turn, is the foundation for modern cognitive behavioral therapy, so Stankiewicz would seem to be on solid ground, though it wouldn’t be very innovative.
But he is not on solid ground at all. Because he means something far more radical, and far less substantiated, than Epictetus’s distinction between facts and value judgments. He replaces truth with utility, and thereof the trouble begins. Let me try to contrast the two approaches as clearly as I can, hopefully doing justice to Reformed Stoicism while at the same time attempting to highlight why it is, in my opinion, so problematic.
When Epictetus separates facts from opinions he is not telling us that we cannot know facts about the world. Indeed, truth, for the Stoics, is fundamental, and an honest search for it is considered a virtue. Take the following example: you have just lost your job. That’s a fact. Then you add: “and it’s a catastrophe!” The latter is a value judgment, which—unlike the fact—can be challenged. Is it really a catastrophe? Perhaps it’s an opportunity. Maybe you were stuck in a career that was going nowhere and this is your chance to change direction. The facts are out there, but it is in your power, within limits, to reframe your understanding of them in a way that allows you to endure or even move forward. The obstacle becomes the way, to paraphrase Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, V.20)
Stankiewicz, by contrast, rejects the notion of being able to access the truth at all. He has to, because he has done away with logic. What he is left with, then, is a kind of pragmatism. He talks about “narratives” and says that we should get rid of useless or damaging narratives and construct instead useful ones, defining them as those that improve our well-being. Crucially, such narratives don’t have to be “true,” since truth itself is unreachable.
The overall approach is reminiscent (though I don’t know whether Stankiewicz meant it to be) of the philosophy known as American pragmatism. Pragmatism is what famously led one of its leading proponents, William James, to advocate what he called “the will to believe.” Is there any evidence or reason supporting belief in God? No, but if such belief, such narrative, helps you, then you have a license to embrace it. James was harshly criticized by William K. Clifford (see my recent essay on Cicero) who claimed that “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” Independently of how much the resulting “narrative” may be useful to you.
Stankiewicz’s take also sounds very much like that of the Sophist Protagoras of Abdera. He too rejected the notion that we could ever have access to the truth, but nevertheless insisted that some “impressions” (what Stankiewicz calls “narratives”) are better than others. Better according to which criterion? Again, usefulness.
At one point, early on in his book, Stankiewicz writes:
“A toothache would automatically tarnish any possibility for happiness. Yet, this is not the case. It may be difficult but it’s definitely possible to be happy despite a toothache.” (p. 5)
Well, not exactly. It depends on what one means by “happy.” A toothache is certainly not going to tarnish my eudaimonia, i.e., my overall life project (“all things considered,” Becker would say). But it sure as hell is going to get in the way of my immediate happiness in the sense of a feeling of euphoria and wellbeing. That’s because the headache is a pain, and it doesn’t matter how much I reframe it by way of narratives. It’s going to keep hurting until I go to the dentist and have it taken care of.
Near the end of the book, Stankiewicz says:
[Fate, nature, hegemonikon, logos, oikeiosis] ... All these concepts are prone to change their meaning over time, get blurred, be questioned. More than that: our understanding of them rests inevitably on the historical, social, economic, political and other constraints of the time. Thus, after two thousand years, we have little insight into their original meaning and more importantly we don’t have much chance to build a relevant ethical theory on them” (p. 322).
Well, yes, things change, and our understanding of them (hopefully) improves. That is precisely why philosophies need to be updated, from time to time. But it is simply not true that we have little insight into what the Stoics meant, and even less true that we can’t get a good ethical theory on the basis of such insights.
“Reformed Stoicism aims to be independent of grand narratives and universal explanations. Hence the reluctance towards any one-size-fits-all protocol that matches a specific tool to a given problem. No ready-made answer will suit everyone. In reformed Stoicism, we go over the toolkit together, but each decides for themselves.” (p. 328)
That’s a nice idea, but we simply cannot do without what Stankiewicz derisively calls “grand narratives.” The only significant recent attempt at doing something along those lines is the post-modern movement in literary criticism and philosophy, which not only is a type of grand narrative of its own, but ended up fostering science denialism and the pernicious era of “alternative facts,” thus making Clifford’s warning very concrete indeed.
Stankiewicz is right that that we should be wary of totalizing narratives, and that it is up to us to “go over the toolkit” and decide for ourselves. But this can’t be done without reference points, without at least some level of understanding and appreciation for how the world actually is and for how to best reason about it. The latter point was clearly made by Epictetus:
“Someone in the audience said, ‘Convince me of the usefulness of logic.’
Shall I prove it to you?
‘Yes, please.’
Then I’d better use a demonstrative argument, hadn’t I?
His interlocutor agreed, and Epictetus went on:
So how will you know if my argument is fallacious?
The man said nothing.
Do you see, Epictetus said, that you are yourself admitting that logic is necessary, since without it you can’t even find out whether or not it’s necessary?” (Discourses, II.25)
How would a Reformed Stoic respond to Epictetus, I wonder?
Let me conclude with a table of what Stankiewicz calls the 13 principles underlying his approach:
Several entries are not problematic, and in fact do not differ significantly either from ancient Stoicism or from attempts like Becker’s. For instance: “Reformed Stoicism is not tantamount to asceticism.” Neither was the ancient variety, despite common misconceptions. The ascetics were the Stoics’ philosophical cousins, the Cynics.
“Reformed Stoicism is not a negative or merely resilient philosophy, it is also a positive psychology.” Again, this is certainly true for ancient Stoicism as well.
When Stankiewicz says that Reformed Stoicism isn’t specific in its advice about what to do, again he is mirroring the established tradition. Virtue ethics in general is a kind of situational ethics, whereby the answer to specific ethical questions is always going to be “it depends” (on the details of the situation itself, as well as on the characteristics of the moral agent).
The problematic bits, as it should by now be clear, are nn. 1 (doing away with metaphysics and universal truths), 2 (rejection of science and logic), and 13 (Stoicism is not an all-encompassing system). Let me briefly discuss the latter, since we have already looked at the first two.
Stoicism, like any other philosophy of life, is indeed an all-encompassing system (Stankiewicz uses the pejorative phrase “totalizing”). It does claim us “fully and forever.” And that’s not at all a bad thing. You can’t be a part-time Christian or Buddhist, on penalty of incoherence. (Though, to be fair, you would be bothered by incoherence only if you thought logic were important…)
This is not the same as saying that Stoicism is dogmatic and inflexible. After all, this whole series of essays is devoted to exploring ways to change and update the system. But a system it is nevertheless. If it were not, then we would be free to do whatever we felt like, engaging not in rational thinking (logic, again!) but in rationalizations. And there already is more than enough of that in the world.
[Previous installments: Stoic physics; Stoic logic; Stoic ethics; Becker’s update. Next time: Steven Gambardella’s new modern Stoicism.]
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[1] Throughout this series of essays I am using “science” and “metaphysics” as synonymous, both meaning, roughly, “understanding of the world as it is,” and coincident with the ancient Stoic word “physics.” This usage is unusual in modern terms, but it is based on an interesting and very useful approach called scientific metaphysics, articulated primarily by James Ladyman and Don Ross.
I finally found time to read your text, Massimo. I agree with you. I had the opportunity to listen to the podcast with Stankiewicz in Polish, and even in Polish it was incomprehensible and quite chaotic for me. thanks for your great text and organizing all this disharmonious vision of Stankiewicz.
Thanks very much for this article. In the past I have listened to presentations by Staniewicz and found them incomprehensible, so I looked forward to your article with particular interest. In short, I think you have saved me a lot of time and effort that I can more usefully direct elsewhere in my Stoic development.
There are three things in your account of Reformed Stoicism that give me a bit of a negative knee jerk reaction - sort of alarm bells ringing - is this sensible / does this make sense?. First Staniewiez rejects the notion of being able to access truth at all. I am reminded of the pyrrhonists, who seem to me to extend their basic idea into a tangled web that does not repay the effort to understand it. Second, as a fan of Cicero and his arguments for the honourable and the expedient, I find it hard to swallow the idea of usefulnes as a core principle of what is a virtuous action.
Third, the list of 13 principles: is this yours Massimo, or is it from Staniewicz's book? I am struck by how negative most of the principles are; they are largely stated as what RS is not!
Perhaps to help me finally decide whether or not RS is worth more of my time and effort, it would be helpful to have a worked example of a problem that shows an analysis and conclusion according to the principles of usefulness. Is there one you could pull from the book? Then I might be able to better understand the rationale of RS. Thanks.