A conversation on Pyrrhonian skepticism
I had a Socratic dialogue with ChatGPT about suspension of judgment and mental tranquillity
[Me] Let’s have a philosophical dialogue in the style of Plato. You will explain and defend the philosophy of Pyrrhonian skepticism and I will attempt to criticize it. You begin with a very short summary of Pyrrhonism. Please keep your answers brief so that this will be a dialogue, not a lecture on your part.
[Chat] In the spirit of a Platonic dialogue, I shall assume the role of a proponent of Pyrrhonism, a school of skepticism founded by Pyrrho of Elis.
Greetings, seeker of wisdom. Pyrrhonism, as an approach to life and knowledge, advocates that one should suspend judgment (epoché) regarding beliefs. This suspension leads to ataraxia—peace of mind or tranquility—because it liberates us from the anxiety of asserting falsehoods as truths. We assert nothing definitively, not even skepticism itself. The core of Pyrrhonian skepticism is to continually question, to oppose arguments with counterarguments, thereby remaining uncommitted to any particular truth and maintaining mental balance. What concerns might you have about such a stance?
[Me] Well, the first thing that comes to mind is why did the Pyrrhonists believe that ataraxia should be the goal of life. Other Greco-Roman schools disagreed. The Stoics, for instance, as well as the Cynics, thought that virtue should be the goal. Aristotle thought that a combination of virtue and external goods, such as health, fame, and reputation, qualify. So why ataraxia?
[Chat] A thoughtful query, indeed. The Pyrrhonists observed the turmoil that often arises from our attachment to beliefs—how they lead us into conflicts and distress. Unlike the Stoics or Aristotelians who posit a positive state to be achieved through specific ethical behavior or external conditions, Pyrrhonism suggests a form of psychological freedom that comes from detachment.
Ataraxia, or tranquility, is not pursued as a traditional goal but emerges as a natural consequence of suspending judgment. It is not that Pyrrhonists hold tranquility as the ultimate good in the moral sense, but rather as the optimal state for human experience under the condition of epistemic suspension. This tranquility is seen as preferable because it avoids the disturbances that accompany dogmatic beliefs, including the pursuit of virtue itself, which can lead to inner turmoil when one fails to live up to these virtues or when external goods are lost.
In essence, ataraxia is a practical and achievable end that ensures a person remains untroubled by the variability of human life and the limitations of human knowledge.
[Me] It is certainly possible to consider ataraxia the goal of life. But it strikes me that that’s just as much an assumption as those made by the so-called dogmatic schools. The Stoics do make assumptions, which they attempt to defend by way of argument, that lead them to conclude that virtue is the only true good. But it seems to me that the Pyrrhonists are also making assumptions here, and they actually do not seem to have an explicitly stated argument to defend them.
If they are claiming that ataraxia is what human beings naturally seek then that strikes me as an empirical statement. Do they have data to back it up?
[Chat] Indeed, your observation pierces to the heart of a subtle yet profound aspect of Pyrrhonism. It might appear at first that Pyrrhonists are simply replacing one set of assumptions (virtue, pleasure, etc.) with another (ataraxia). However, the crucial distinction lies in the nature and approach to these assumptions.
Pyrrhonists would argue that ataraxia as a goal is not posited as an empirical universal claim about what all humans naturally seek, but as a reflective conclusion from personal and observed experiences. This is less about empirical data and more about introspective clarity regarding the nature of disturbance and tranquility. The claim is not that everyone does or must seek tranquility, but that tranquility follows naturally from the suspension of judgments, which itself is a method for dealing with the indeterminacy of knowledge claims and the strife they often cause.
Moreover, Pyrrhonists do not dogmatically hold to ataraxia; they find themselves in that state as a consequence of their practice of epoché. The practice is pragmatic and experiential rather than theoretical. Thus, they might suggest that one need not accept their word for it but instead experiment with suspending judgments to see if tranquility does indeed follow.
In this sense, Pyrrhonism can be seen not as a doctrine with assertions about what should be, but as a therapeutic approach, offering a method one might follow to personally verify whether its outcomes—tranquility and freedom from disturbance—hold true.
[Me] I get the distinction you are trying to make. However, there are, seems to me, two possibilities. One, an individual Pyrrhonist observes that, for him, ataraxia is the experiential outcome of practicing epoché. That’s a personal statement, insufficient to build a general philosophy.
Two, Pyrrhonists are making the claim that ataraxia is a frequent experiential outcome of practicing epoché in general. But that’s an empirical conclusion that requires data to back it up. In fact, one could argue that direct observation of human behavior leads us to conclude that sometimes suspending judgment does lead to serenity, but in other cases it triggers anxiety because of unresolved uncertainties.
Also, it begins to sound to me like the Pyrrhonist is engaging in a circular argument: epoché is good because it leads to ataraxia, but ataraxia is good because it naturally comes from epoché. As you know, circularity is rarely a virtue in philosophical argumentation.
[Chat] You raise incisive points that touch on the core of the Pyrrhonian method and its philosophical implications. Let us address them in turn.
First, regarding the observation that ataraxia results from epoché, you rightly note that this could be a personal, anecdotal observation rather than a universal truth. Pyrrhonists would likely embrace this critique, as their philosophy inherently resists the formulation of universal, dogmatic claims. Each practitioner’s experience is indeed personal and variable; hence, Pyrrhonism primarily offers a method rather than a doctrine. It suggests, “Try suspending your judgments and observe what happens,” rather than, “This will definitely lead to tranquility for all.”
Second, the empirical nature of the claim that ataraxia usually follows epoché poses a significant challenge. Pyrrhonists would perhaps concede that their conclusions are drawn from observed patterns rather than systematic data. However, they might argue that their approach is continually open to revision based on new experiences and reflections, unlike dogmatic systems which assert truths that must be defended against contradiction. The openness to reevaluation is a key feature that keeps Pyrrhonism dynamic and adaptable, rather than rigidly empirical.
Regarding your point about the circularity of the argument for epoché and ataraxia, this is a critical observation. Pyrrhonists might respond by clarifying that they do not claim ataraxia as an inherent good in the ethical or moral sense (as virtue is to the Stoics). Rather, they describe it as a state that naturally emerges and is desirable in the pragmatic sense that it alleviates disturbance. The good of ataraxia is not prescribed but described based on experiential outcomes. Thus, they might argue that the circle is not viciously so, as the premise and the conclusion are not identical but are experientially linked.
Finally, about anxiety from unresolved uncertainties, Pyrrhonists would likely recognize this as part of human experience but argue that the practice of epoché, when deeply integrated, leads over time to a different relationship with uncertainty—one where the lack of resolution is not a source of anxiety but a recognized aspect of the human condition that one can live with serenely.
[Me] Well, I dislike the Pyrrhonist use of the word “dogmatic,” which especially in modern English sounds a bit too much like an ad hominem attack. Also, pragmatism itself is the result of a particular theoretical framework, so I don’t find it convincing to set “dogmatism” and “pragmatism” as so clearly opposed to each other.
However, I do have other concerns about Pyrrhonism. Maybe we can make some progress by addressing those.
For instance, the Pyrrhonists make a big deal out of their distinction between things that are “evident” and things that are “non-evident.” They claim, if I understand them correctly, that we should suspend judgment about non-evident matters while evident matters are subject to criteria for action which include common opinion, expert opinion, personal feelings, and the like.
But what, exactly, is the line separating evident from non-evident matters? What may seem evident to someone may be non-evident to someone else, and vice versa. Do you have any thoughts on that?
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